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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of immigration and immigration amnesties on the
shadow economy. We find a robust and positive relationship between the presence
of immigrants and the unobserved economic activity at the local level, but the im-
plementation of a large immigration amnesty substantially weakens this link. Our
analysis exploits newly compiled datasets of Italian immigration and shadow economy
estimates for the years 1995-2006, comprising a panel of local-level aggregate statisti-
cal information, and a micro-level survey of representative households. We exploit the
discontinuity created by the 2002 immigration amnesty, which increased the stock of
migrants by almost 50%.
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Immigration and immigration policies are very often at the forefront of the political debate,
especially in destination countries. The narrative relies on the effects that immigration might
have on the local labor market as well as on other relevant socio-economic aspects such as
public finances, local services and crime. Along this line, this paper investigates two aspects
of immigration, which are, to our knowledge, yet to be explored. First, it examines the
relationship between immigration and the shadow economy. Second, it analyzes whether this
link is affected by immigration amnesties, which determine a substantial variation to the
stock of legal and illegal immigrants in a country.
The shadow economy accounts for between a third and a half of total GDP in developing
countries (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008) and more than 20% of official income in developed
economies such as Belgium, Greece, Italy and Spain (Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro,
2010). Identifying the socio-economic determinants of this phenomenon and tackling it with
sound policies have always been central tasks for policy-makers and researchers.
There are various reasons to believe that the link between immigration and unobserved
economic activities exists, and is relevant. First, undocumented immigrants are barred from
working in the formal sector, naturally feeding the unofficial economy. Second, immigrants
are often employed in low-skilled jobs, where the rate of irregularity tends to be higher.
Immigrants may also lack network, language skills, or be subject to outright discrimination:
for all these reasons they may be more likely to accept (or be offered) irregular jobs. More
generally, and perhaps more importantly, a stronger presence of immigrants in a locality may
affect the incentives of firms to use illegal workers, and generate a local labor market more
reliant on illegal workforce, whether native or immigrant.
The above-mentioned link between immigration and shadow economy may be significantly
weakened by immigration amnesties. Increasing the relative number of legal immigrants in a
country may effectively improve their labor market conditions, their capability to be employed
in high-skilled jobs and, ultimately, their propensity to work in the official economy.
In the first part of the paper, we analyze the impact of immigration on the informal sector
at both individual and local level over the period 1995-2006 in Italy. The shadow economy
is by definition hidden and thus it is difficult to measure. Hence, in order to obtain robust
results, we adopt three different estimates of the unobserved economic activity. First, we
collect the regional-level official estimates of the share of irregular employment, measured by
the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). Second, through the standard Electricity
Consumption approach we construct a measure of shadow economy at the province (more
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disaggregate) level. Third, we measure the individual propensity to operate informally by
using the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy. As
a measure of immigration we use administrative data on the issuance of residence permits at
the local level (region or province) in a year. In the second part of the paper, we study the
role of immigration amnesties in reducing the informal economic activity. In particular, we
focus on the 2002 immigration reform, when almost 700,000 illegal immigrants were granted
legal status, increasing the stock of legal immigrant by almost 50%.
In a nutshell, we document that the share of the shadow economy is affected by the
presence of immigrants. However, this link is substantially weakened by the 2002 amnesty.
These results are robust to instrumental variables and placebo analysis, and suggest that the
relationship between underground economy and immigration is mostly driven by the presence
of illegal immigrants, or, analogously, by the restrictions in granting legal status.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional background, Sec-
tion 3 reviews the relevant literature, Section 4 includes the empirical analysis, Section 5
concludes.
2 Institutional Background on Immigration
Italy has historically been a country of emigration, with people moving towards the Americas
between the 19th and 20th century, and towards Northern Europe after World War Two.
Unlike other European countries like France or the UK, Italy has a very limited colonial
past, and therefore did not bear the flows of immigration that followed de-colonisation.
Immigration started to become a visible phenomenon only in the Eighties; early government
interventions were mainly aimed at regularizing the stock of immigrants already residing in
the country, rather than at managing the inflows.
Amnesties accompanied all immigration bills in 1990, 1995, 1998 and 2002. Further
amnesties have been implemented in 2009 and 2012. Since 1998, the system became based
on annual quotas set by the government. The so-called “Flows Decree” (Decreto Flussi) sets
the number of new working residence permits to be issued in a year, subdivided by sector
(construction, domestic services, and a residual category). These permits are contingent
on job contracts, and de facto tend to regularize a quota of the existing (working) illegal
immigrants. The 1998 immigration reform also triggered a number of bilateral agreements
with some of the main countries of emigration, in order to insure repatriation of illegal
immigrants, in exchange of reserved sub-quotas. Each quota is then partitioned across the
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Italian provinces based on an estimated labor demand for foreign workers.1
Since the early Nineties, contrasting illegal immigration has always been at the forefront
of the Italian political debate. When the centre-right coalition, which included the anti-
immigration party Northern League, won with a landslide in the 2001 general elections,
a new immigration bill was passed. This 2002 Immigration reform is the one on which
this paper focuses the most. It was designed to be a restrictive law: it criminalized the
status of illegal immigrant (that previously was just a non-criminal illicit act), and toughened
the identification and deportation procedures. The general management of the inflows was
unchanged, but it was improved with the latest information technology, so much so that for
the first time the almost all of the amnesty applications were processed by the end of the
following year (2003). The 2002 Immigration reform was passed in September 2002, and
included a one-off amnesty on illegal immigrants who could prove to be working in Italy on
the 10th of June 2002. Their employers had to pay a one-off regularization fee, as partial
reimbursement for the evaded social security contributions. This “model” of amnesty was
the same followed in 1998 and, with some variation, in all subsequent amnesties.
As amnesties have been one of the ordinary means of managing immigration, it came
with little surprise that also a government nominally adverse to immigration was issuing one.
However the exact timing and deadlines were largely unpredictable, as they depended mostly
on the timing of the bargaining of specific aspects of the bill within the government coalition.
Moreover, the government itself was surprised of the take-up of this amnesty: throughout
2003 and the beginning of 2004, about 700,000 applications were processed, and over 650,000
of them were accepted, which accounted to almost 50% of the stock of legal immigrants on
the day before the amnesty.
3 Literature Review
This paper’s contribution is threefold: firstly, it expands the literature on the effects of
immigration on economic and non-economic outcomes; secondly, it relates to the works ex-
ploring how legal status and immigration amnesties affect both the native and immigrant
populations; finally, it contributes to the literature on the shadow economy and its causes.
1The official Association of the Chambers of Commerce (Unioncamere) advises the government for this
purpose.
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3.1 Literature on immigration and its effects
The distributional effects of immigrants on the labor market outcomes of natives is one of the
most explored issues in the immigration literature. Borjas (1994) finds that the relative skills
of the “new” immigrants in the United States has declined over time. Moreover, even if there
is a weak negative correlation between immigrants and the earnings of the natives, Borjas
(1994) documents that immigration may have been partly responsible for the reduction in
the earnings of unskilled native workers during the 1980s. Friedberg and Hunt (1995) find
that the empirical literature does not clearly support the hypothesis of a positive relationship
between immigration and the reduction in native employment. Card (2005) uses a cross-city
research design and finds that the local labor market outcomes are only weakly correlated
with immigrant densities.2 More recently, D’Amuri and Peri (2014) focus on Western Europe
in the period 1996-2010 and find that immigrants push natives towards more skill-intense
jobs, and therefore have a positive effect on natives’ wages, particularly so in countries with
higher labor market flexibility. De Silva et al. (2010) exploit Hurricane Katrina as the cause
of an exogenous source of immigration into Texas, and find that it has a negative effect of
average wages. Regarding the Italian labor market, Venturini (1999) conducts a cross-sector
time-series analysis for the period 1980-1995 and finds a small to non-existent effect of the
presence of immigrants on the employment of native workers. Finally, Venturini and Villosio
(2008) find that (legal) immigrants in Italy tend to have a very different work history than
native workers with analogous observables: they enjoy lower wages and have a more patchy
job history, alternating frequently between regular and irregular jobs.
Another phenomenon which has been largely studied in the literature is the relation-
ship between immigration and crime. According to Borjas (1998), the worse labor market
conditions of the immigrants in the United States can be linked to a higher propensity of
committing crimes. On the other hand, Butcher and Piehl (2007) identify in the risk of
punishment rather than the presence of immigrants the most powerful deterrent to criminal
activities. Using Italian data, Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti (2012) show that immigration
only increases the incidence of robberies, while the impact on the overall crime rate is not
significantly different from zero.
2However, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1996) and Borjas (2003) argue that a cross-city research design
is compromised by the intercity mobility of people, goods and services. These researchers suggest to adopt
an alternative time series analysis of aggregate relative wages. Nevertheless, according to these aggregate
analysis the wages of unskilled native (with less than a high-school diploma) relative to high school graduates
have remained nearly constant since 1980.
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3.2 Literature on the causes of the shadow economy
Our work also relates to the literature exploring the determinants of the shadow economy.
Several studies emphasize the role of social and institutional quality in shaping incentives to
enter the official sector of the economy. Enste and Schneider (2000)’s review points out how
the level of taxation and the regulatory burden are major explanatory factors of the size of the
shadow economy. According to Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000),
entrepreneurs actually go underground not to avoid official taxes, but to reduce the burden
of bureaucracy and corruption. Analyzing a World Bank firm-level survey, Dabla-Norris,
Gradstein, and Inchauste (2008) find a robust link between shadow economy, regulatory
burden and the level of legal enforcement.
Other works on the informal economy focus on the inefficiency of the unofficial firms in
comparison with the official ones. According to La Porta and Shleifer (2008), for example,
unofficial firms tend to be smaller, less productive, with lower capital content and are run by
less educated entrepreneurs. Therefore, growth-enhancing policies are effective instruments
to substantially reduce the weight of the informal sector.
Furthermore, this paper relates also with a literature that analyzes the links between
the shadow economy and additional relevant economic phenomena like inequality, financial
development and banking crisis (Chong and Gradstein, 2007, Capasso and Jappelli, 2013,
Colombo, Onnis, and Tirelli, 2016). In particular, Capasso and Jappelli (2013) study how
areas of Italy which are financially more developed are also showing lower incidence of the
shadow economy. In order to do so they introduce an indicator of the individual propensity
to operate in the informal sector that is very close to that one adopted in this paper.
3.3 The Economic and Non-Economic Effects of Legal Status
There is a strong link between the literature that investigates the effects of gaining legal
status and our analysis on the consequences of immigration amnesties on the size of the
informal sector.
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) estimate that immigrants who were able to get legal
status through an amnesty experience a wage increase. Differently, Kaushal (2006), inves-
tigating the 1997 amnesty enacted in the US for Central-American immigrants, finds little
to no effect on wages of amnestied immigrants. However, she shows a significant effect for
the highly educated amnestied immigrants. More recently, Lozano and Sorensen (2011) show
that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 caused an important long-run increase
in the occupational wage of Mexican immigrants. Similarly, Devillanova, Fasani, and Frattini
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(2014) study the 2002 amnesty program in Italy and document that the prospect of legal
status significantly increases the employment probability of those immigrants that are eligible
for the amnesty.
Finally, Chassamboulli and Peri (2014) develop a theoretical matching model that explains
the effects of immigration policies, both in terms of border restrictions and amnesties, and
calibrate it to study the impact of policy changes to the US and Mexican labor markets.
They find that both decreasing deportation and increasing legalisations have positive effects
on the natives’ job market outcomes. This is because decreasing deportation and increasing
legalisations improve the matching process and increase the available workforce. These two
effects are advantageous also for natives. The positive impact of regularizations on non-labor
market outcomes like crime has been also documented by Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2011).
According to these authors, the immigrant legal status decreases the propensity to commit
crimes by providing immigrants with better income opportunities.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
Both the size of the shadow economy and immigration flows are subject to substantial mea-
surement errors and biases, this generates specific challenges to our analysis. For these reasons
we use a number of techniques and data sources to insure that our results are not affected
by specific measurement issues. We therefore construct separate datasets, disaggregated at
either the regional or provincial level.3
In this section we analyze in details strengths and weaknesses of our estimates.
4.1.1 The estimates of the shadow economy
We adopt three different estimates of the unobserved economic activity. The first one is
a regional measure of the share of irregular employment obtained by the Italian National
Statistical Institute (ISTAT). The ISTAT measure of irregular work is based on the concept
of full-time equivalent units. The index used in this paper, in particular, is given by the
percentage ratio of irregular full-time equivalent units to total full-time equivalent units.4
The unofficial employment is calculated as the difference between labor demand and labor
3Italy is subdivided in 20 regions and 95 provinces. The number of provinces has been increasing through-
out the years. The immigration data in 1995 were still based on 95 provinces, therefore we decided to use
this as a point of reference.
4The full-time equivalent units represent the transformation of labor provided into full-time units and are
obtained from the sum of full-time and part-time jobs (main and secondary) transformed into full-time units.
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supply. The labor supply data derive in turn from several sources—i.e. the ISTAT Population
and Houses Census and Labor Force Survey—and are considered an exhaustive measure of
the overall (official plus unofficial) labor supply.5 These labor supply data also encompass
information on foreign workers, both regular and irregular.
The use of several statistical and administrative sources makes the ISTAT estimate of
the undeclared work a highly reliable measure of the Italian unobserved economic activity.
Unfortunately, this measure is only available at the regional level, with only 20 observations
per year, with obvious consequences on statistical power.6
Our second measure of the shadow economy is obtained by applying the standard Elec-
tricity Consumption (EC) approach to a panel of 95 provinces. The EC technique is largely
used in the literature (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Chong and Gradstein, 2007; Colombo,
Onnis, and Tirelli, 2016) and estimates total (observed plus unobserved) income by assuming
that the ratio of electricity consumption to the overall economic activity is constant thorough
time. Under such an assumption, the electricity consumption growth is used as a proxy for
the growth of total GDP. Once the growth in the overall economic activity is obtained, the
difference between the growth rate of official income and the growth rate of total income is
imputed to the growth in the unobserved economy (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996).
In this work, we obtain the growth rates of the unrecorded income at province level for
the period 1995 − 2006.7 Then, we peg the resulting growth rates to pre-existing base year
estimates of tax evasion obtained by the Italian Revenue Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate) for
the year 2000 (Pisani and Polito, 2006). These estimates measure the province-level value of
the undeclared tax base for IRAP, a corporate tax on firm revenues. From this measure as
base year, we derive two separate series of shadow economy: the value of evaded IRAP tax
base as a share of GDP (Shadow1 ), and the value of evaded IRAP tax base as a share of the
overall IRAP tax base (Shadow2 ).
Even if the EC approach allows us to easily obtain more disaggregated estimates of the
shadow economy8, this methodology is open to criticism. A first commonly raised objection
5Labor supply survey data are inevitably sensitive to the way the questionnaire is formulated and strongly
depend on the respondents’ willingness to cooperate (Enste and Schneider, 2000).
6A further problem with these data comes from some methodological changes due to the adoption of the
European System of Account 95. ISTAT provides two overlapping time series: 1990-2002 and 2000-2009,
with incongruent figures in the intersection of these intervals. Our results are qualitatively unaffected by the
use of one, the other, or an average of the two time series for the three years of overlap. The use of time
fixed effects may contribute to the stability of our estimates.
7The data on electricity consumption and official GDP are from Terna (the company owning the national
electric grid) and ISTAT, respectively.
8In the absence of available province-level data on cash demand, we can’t adopt other macroeconomic
methods like the Currency Demand and MIMIC approaches.
8
to the EC technique is that not all unofficial economic activities require a considerable amount
of electricity. Furthermore, other energy sources such as gas and oil can be used (La Porta
and Shleifer, 2008). Therefore, this approach would be capable to capture only a part of
the shadow economy. This might be particularly true for developed countries characterized
by high shares of unobserved economies in sectors such as agriculture, constructions, and
personal service. Nevertheless, according to the International Energy Agency statistics, there
is actually evidence of high shares of electricity consumption in the Italian construction
industry over the last few decades. In particular, in 1990 about 70% of the total energy
consumed in the Italian construction sector was electricity. This percentage remained higher
than 50% throughout the period 1990-2000.
Critics of the EC methodology also emphasize the potential downward bias caused by
energy-saving technological progress. However, it cannot be taken for granted that the tech-
nological change will reduce the energy intensity of aggregate production (Jevons, 1965). In
fact, following an improvement in energy efficiency, the fall in energy prices might cause a
substitution effect towards more energy-intensive goods and production techniques. Further-
more, the income effect might raise household consumption of all commodities, including
energy consumption.9
An overall decline in the EC shadow economy estimates could actually support the ob-
jection that the use of electricity is more efficient over time given the technological progress.
Nevertheless, our measure describes a reduction in the relative size of unobserved income
only for a small subset of provinces. Specifically, the mean value of the annual growth rates
of the EC estimates over the period 1995-2006 is negative for 21 provinces.10
The last measure of informal activity adopted in this paper is a microeconomic indicator
aimed at measuring the individual propensity to operate in the unofficial sector. In order
to obtain this microeconomic measure of the shadow economy, we use the Bank of Italy’s
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
The SHIW is a biannual cross-sectional survey comprising about 8,000 households (24,000
individuals). The survey sample is a representative subset of the Italian resident population
and provides detailed information on demographic characteristics, income and wealth.
The SHIW questionnaire doesn’t include a direct question on the extent to which each
individual operates in the unofficial sector. However, as suggested by Capasso and Jappelli
9Allan et al. (2007) report a rebound effect between 30 and 50%. Dimitropoulos (2007) obtains even
stronger rebound effects.
10Belluno, Brindisi, Caltanissetta, Caserta, Genova, Grosseto, Latina, Massa-Carrara, Matera, Napoli,
Nuoro, Palermo, Ragusa, Rieti, Sassari, Savona, Taranto, Terni, Torino, Trieste and Venezia.
9
(2013), it is possible to infer the degree of irregular activity through the following two ques-
tions: i) How old were you when you started working? ii) For how many years did you or your
employer not pay social security contributions?. With these two questions, we are therefore
able to construct a microeconomic measure of informal activity (Irregularity Index ) for the
years in our sample period when the survey was performed (1995, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006).11
Specifically, we divide the number of years not covered by social security contributions by
the length of the entire working life.12
We believe that our microeconomic index is a good indicator of the incidence of illegal jobs
in a local labor market and—unlike the previously discussed aggregate measures—it allows
us to control for the individual level characteristics of surveyed workers. Nevertheless, also
this survey-based measure is subject to criticism, as it is well known that surveys tend to rely
on respondent truthfully answering the survey questions, and under-represent categories such
as (legal and illegal) immigrants. In this respect we need to stress that our microeconomic
indicator aims at measuring the propensity to evade in a single locality. We are not trying to
catch the propensity to evade of the immigrant population, as this would require field data
that is not available to us.
To conclude, our conviction is that notwithstanding their well-known limitations, our
measurements show a high degree of accuracy. We construct a regional-level time series of
our four indicators (ISTAT irregular job rate, two measures from the EC approach, and the
survey-based Irregularity Index ), and check their correlation. As one can see from Figures
1-3 and Table 1, the correlation between the ISTAT figures and the other three measures of
shadow economy is very high and always statistically significant.
4.1.2 Immigration
As a measure of immigration we use the number of valid residence permits per 100,000
inhabitants issued in a province.13 This measure includes only adults14 and doesn’t comprise
the presence of undocumented immigrants. Because of this omitted variable problem—i.e.
the illegal immigrants are unobservable in official statistics—the natural positive link between
irregular immigrants and the informal economic activity may bias the analysis on the impact
of documented immigration on the size of the shadow economy.15
11These questions were not asked in previous waves of the Survey.
12Our microeconomic estimate of the informal activity doesn’t include individuals who do not report years
of contributions, are not part of the labor force, or who work in the public or agricultural sectors.
13Source: Interior Ministry and ISTAT.
14Children are usually included in their parents’ permit.
15We concentrate on the period up to 2006, as in 2007 also citizens from countries, which joined the EU
in 2004 (such as Poland or Hungary), were allowed to work in Italy without the need of a work permit.
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In order to tackle this problem we take logarithms and include dummy variables for
geographical areas and time periods. As described by Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti (2012),
this procedure may significantly reduce our omitted variable bias. Specifically, the logarithms
of total immigrants (M∗) can be defined as the sum of the logarithms of official immigrants
(M) plus geographical (province or regional) (αl) and time (δt) fixed effects, i.e.
M∗l,t = αl + δt +Ml,t (1)
Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti (2012) state that the regularisations of previously unoffi-
cial immigrants can improve the level of accuracy of the above approximation. In particular,
by using the administrative data of the three regularisations taking place in Italy in 1995,
1998 and 2002, they show that the OLS estimated coefficient of (M) is very close to 1 with
a 99% R2 coefficient.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that legal immigrants have always been highly incor-
porated in the Italian informal sector. As Venturini and Villosio (2008) note, legal immigrants
in Italy tend to switch back and forth between regular and irregular jobs for a number of
reasons: for example, low-skilled jobs are generally less stable and irregular jobs may be more
rewarding in terms of net pay (as no social security contribution is given).
4.1.3 Controls
The presence of different types of measures of the shadow economy, implies the use of different
datasets and, therefore, different sets of controls.
The first two datasets are based on aggregate region- and province-level measures of the
shadow economy. For these two datasets we use aggregate measures as controls. In addition
to the (real, log) GDP per capita, we include the turnout at the most recent European
Parliament elections, as a proxy for social capital. As these elections are not directly linked
to the election of a government, it is widely believed in the literature that turning out is
analogous to voluntarily providing a public good.16 These elections are held every five years,
therefore our datasets include data from 1994, 1999, and 2004. Similarly to Capasso and
Jappelli (2013), we also include an index of the efficiency of local civil courts as a proxy for
the civil service efficiency. This is the only nation-wide measurable (and measured) output of
the central civil service, and we believe that it may help us to capture the different efficiency
in enforcement. To be consistent with the aggregation level of our dependent variables, all
these variables are aggregated at the regional or provincial level.
16See Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) and Grafstein (1991).
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The micro-level analysis based on the SHIW survey includes individual level character-
istics such as the household disposable income, age, gender, marital status, education, and
whether the subject is non-employed or self-employed. Similarly to the aggregate-level data,
it also includes additional controls aggregated at the regional level,17 such as social capital
and civil-court efficiency index.
Table 2 presents the aggregate variables, while Table 3 reports the summary statistics for
the micro-level dataset.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
Our approach first focuses on establishing the link between the presence of immigrants and
informal sector in the economy. In first instance we rely on simple OLS regressions, and then
we use an instrumental-variable approach to deal with potential reverse causality problems,
i.e. the possibility that localities with a stronger presence of the shadow economy might be
more attractive to immigrants. Then, we analyze the effects of amnesties and their impact
on the link between immigration and the informal economic activity.
4.2.1 The link between immigration and the shadow economy. OLS estimation
We start by performing OLS regressions on our datasets. From our panels comprising
aggregate-level data we perform OLS regressions with regional/provincial and year fixed
effects. The specification can be described as follows:
yl,t = α + βMl,t + γZl,t + ul + τt + εl,t (2)
where yl,t is the proxy for the size of the shadow economy in locality l at time t, Ml,t is the log
of immigrants per 100,000 inhabitants in locality l at time t, and Z is the matrix of controls
including the GDP per capita (deflated and logged), the index of efficiency of civil courts
and the turnout at the more recent European elections. Finally, τt and ul represent year and
locality fixed effects, respectively, while εl,t is the error term.
Using the microeconomic dataset, our main equation is
yi,r,t = α + βMr,t + γXi,r,t + λZr,t + ul + τt + εi,r,t, (3)
where yi,r,t is the indicator of irregular activities for the individual i in region r at time t,
Mr,t is the log of immigrants per 100,000 inhabitants in region r at time t, X is the set of
17The SHIW survey only includes the regional identifiers of interviewed subjects.
12
the individual demographic and socio-economic indicators, and Z comprises the additional
regional variables. Finally, ul and τt refer to locality
18 and time fixed effects, while εi,r,t is
the error term. 19
The main variable of interest, i.e. immigration, is expected to be positively related to
the informal activity, i.e. β > 0. The reasons to believe this are various. According to
Del Boca and Venturini (2003), immigrants in Italy earn significantly less than natives.
This is partly due to the fact that they are on average younger and low-skilled. Moreover,
immigrants also experience worse labor market outcomes than natives with similar individual
characteristics, possibly because of discrimination or lack of network. On this ground, we
expect a significantly high incorporation of immigrants in the irregular market. Furthermore,
having less bargaining power and a weaker support network, immigrants may be relatively
more willing to take irregular jobs than the indigenous population. More generally, the
presence of immigrants in a locality may modify the labor market conditions, generating a
labor market equilibrium which is relatively more reliant on illegal workers, irrespective of
their nationality.
We also expect that women, younger individuals, individuals with lower levels of education
and who are not married, unemployed and self-employed workers are more likely to operate
irregularly. At the same time, we expect a negative relationship between disposable income
and the probability of working in the informal sector.
Finally, we expect a negative relationship between the measures of GDP, social capital
and civil service efficiency and the propensity to operate in the shadow economy (see Capasso
and Jappelli, 2013).
The results in 4 and Tables 5 show the strength of the link between immigration and
shadow economy. Specifically, the OLS regressions using aggregate data underline a strong
significant relationship between the shadow economy and immigration. In Table 4, one can
see how for each of the three aggregate measures of the informal economic activity, and
whether controls are included or not, a one percent increase in the immigrant population is
correlated with an increase of the share of irregular jobs by 1.6% (columns 1 and 2), and an
increase in the shadow economy of at least 0.7% of GDP (columns 3 and 4), or 1.1% of IRAP
tax base (columns 5 and 6).
The micro-level analysis documents that a 1% increase in the share of immigrant in the
18The local fixed-effects refer to the following four macro-area: North-West, North-East, Centre, South,
Islands.
19The microeconomic dataset is a repeated cross-section and includes the following waves: 1995, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006.
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population is correlated with a 2.7% increase in the Irregularity Index (see Table 5). It must
be highlighted once more how this regression aims to capture the effect in the propensity of
evading social security taxes (whether the subject is Italian or not), caused by the presence of
immigrants. Our conjecture is that a job market with a heavier presence of immigrants gen-
erates different incentives with respect to labor-law compliance, because of the competition,
especially in some sectors, between indigenous and immigrant workforces.
All the control variables (but age) have the expected signs in the microeconomic estimates
(see Table 5). On the contrary, the province-level data do not show any significant relation-
ship between social capital, civil service efficiency and the size of the informal sector (Table 4,
columns 4 and 6), while the link between GDP and shadow economy is as expected negative
and statistically significant. Furthermore, by using the regional-level data the relationship
between the control variables and the irregular job rate is always positive and significant
(Table 4, columns 2).
4.2.2 The link between immigration and the shadow economy. Instrumental
variable analysis
The causal nexus between immigration and unobserved economic activity could be in the
opposite direction to the one described above: we cannot exclude the possibility that immi-
grants are attracted to geographical areas where the demand of undeclared work is higher.
Taking into consideration this potential endogeneity problem, we re-estimate the link
between the shadow economy and immigration by adopting a Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS)
approach requiring an instrument for the immigration variable.
The choice of this instrument is based on a specific strategy which has been widely
used in the literature (see Card, 2001, Card, 2005, Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti, 2012,
D’Amuri and Peri, 2014). In particular, in order to control for the “assortative matching” of
immigrants into localities with larger availability of illegal jobs, we construct an instrumental
variable from the re-allocation of the stock of immigrants in a given year across localities,
according to the distribution that each national group had either at the beginning of the
data series, or a few years before that.
We apply this technique using the earliest available data on immigrants in our possession,
i.e. year 1991. In other words, for each nationality present in Italy, we calculate the stock of
immigrants from that country in a given year, and re-allocate them across localities (regions
or provinces) according to the way they were distributed in 1991.20
20We perform this exercize using both the top 20 countries of origin in 1991, covering more than 90% of
the stock of immigrant in each year, and all countries of origin. The results are hardly distinguishable, and
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This method relies on the observation that new waves of immigrants tend to exploit their
national networks and settle in locations where a community of immigrants from the same
country already exists.








where j is the country of origin of the immigrant, l is the Italian locality (region or province,
depending on the dataset) of residence, and t the year.
The 2SLS estimation results are reported in Tables 6 (aggregate datasets) and 7 (micro-
level dataset). As in the previous tables, we use all the measures of the shadow economy,
and report the regressions both with and without controls. These results strongly confirm
the ones obtained by OLS, showing an even more pronounced link between the presence of
immigrants and the incidence of informal economic activity.21
In particular, focusing on the aggregate datasets (Table 6), we can see that an increase
by 1% in the presence of immigrants in a province generates a 7% increase to the irregular
job rate (column 2), a 5% increase to the shadow economy as a share of GDP (column 4),
and a 9% increase to the evaded IRAP tax base (column 6).
Similarly, looking at our micro-level dataset (Table 7), we can see how the effect of
immigration on the shadow economy appears even stronger under an IV analysis: up to almost
0.4% increase in the propensity to evade for a 1% increase in the immigrant population.
4.2.3 The role of amnesties
The second part of this empirical analysis focuses on the effects of amnesties on both the
informal economic activity and the relationship between immigration and the shadow econ-
omy. In particular, our purpose is to exploit the strong discontinuity shown by the Italian
immigration flows data generated by the 2002 Bossi-Fini Immigration Reform (Figure 4).
As already mentioned, amnesties have been a regular fixture in the legislation of immi-
gration in Italy. As one can see from Table 8, roughly every five years, in correspondence
with major or minor immigration reforms, an amnesty has been issued. The peculiarity of
the 2002 amnesty lies in the fact that the take-up was much larger than anticipated: the ap-
plications equalled almost 50% of the stock of legal immigrants, together with an acceptance
we report only the former. Of course, we correct the coding in order to encompass the geopolitical changes,
taking as a point of reference the countries existing in 1991.
21According to the standard diagnostic tests, the instrument for immigration is not weak and explains well
the endogenous variable. The results are available upon request.
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rate of over 90% (and a relatively quick processing time).
The details on the eligibility criteria were very similar to the previous (1998) and successive
(2009, 2012) amnesties, but the specific deadlines and cut-offs were largely unpredictable: the
bill was passed in September, and the main eligibility criterion hinged on the illegal immigrant
being able to prove to be in work 90 days before the bill was passed. Moreover, differently
from previous amnesties, applications had to be filed by employers and not by the applicant
themselves22.
The 2002 immigration amnesty has been implemented simultaneously in the whole coun-
try. This implies that we cannot exploit any time variation across provinces. Nevertheless,
we can exploit the different intensity of the treatment, i.e. the different levels of the take-up
of the amnesty in each province.
Figure 5 shows three maps of Italy, at the provincial level, and it highlights the quartiles
of the weight of the shadow economy as from the Revenue Agency calculation (left, year
2000), pre-amnesty immigration (centre), and amnesty take-up (right). One can observe
how these three—unconditional—geographic distributions differ. Specifically, the shadow
economy prevails in the centre-south, but with peaks of non-compliance in the North-West,
and of compliance in the South. The documented immigration is mostly concentrated in the
more productive areas of the North and Centre-North, and the amnestied immigrants follow
a similar distribution, but with visible local differences.
For our purpose we estimate, with both OLS and 2SLS techniques, the following equation,
yp,t = +α + βMp,t + γPp,t + λPp,t ∗Mp,t + γZp,t + up + t+ εp,t (5)
where yp,t is the proxy for the size of the shadow economy in province p at time t, Mp,t is
the log of immigrants per 100,000 inhabitants in province p at time t, P is the policy dummy
variable, which takes value 1 for observations after the amnesty (year ≥ 2003), and Z is the
set of controls. We also add the interaction between immigration and the policy variable.
As what concerns the IV estimation, as in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt
(2005), we instrument both the immigration variable and interaction term. The instrument
for the former variable is the same discussed in Section 4.2.2 while the instrument for the
latter variable is the product between mIV and P . As the policy would be perfectly collinear
with the year fixed effects, we slightly change our strategy and include a linear year trend
t.23
22Only domestic-service workers were required to file their own applications.
23The results are unaffected if we alternatively include a square or logged year trend. Moreover, the results
showed in Tables 5-6 are not affected by the use of a year trend rather than of a year fixed effects. These
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For this econometric estimation as in equation (5) we cannot use our micro-level dataset.
The SHIW survey does not take place every year and hence it does not reflect a continuous
time dimension. We also decided not to use the official ISTAT measure of irregular jobs
for two reasons. First, the sample size is quite small, with only twenty observations per
year; secondly—and most importantly—the amnesty falls very closely to the moment in
which ISTAT changed the measurement of this rate, making the outcome of this analysis
very unreliable. We, therefore, concentrate on the aggregate province-level dataset with the
shadow estimates Shadow1 and Shadow2.
The overall effect of immigration on the shadow economy is β before the amnesty and
β + λ afterwards, while the effect of the policy on the shadow economy is γ + λM¯ , where M¯
is the average immigration level from the policy year onwards.
The OLS estimation results are reported in Table 9. The nexus between shadow economy
and immigration changes visibly because of the amnesty. Before the amnesty there is a strong
and significant link between the two; after the amnesty this link is substantially weakened
if not completely wiped out. To check this we perform an F-test of the overall significance
and magnitude of the coefficients β + λ for the full-fledged regressions (columns 2 and 4 of
Table 9), corresponding to the marginal effect of immigration on the shadow economy after
the amnesty. The results confirm that the overall marginal effect is positive, but very far
from being significant (a 0.31 p-value for the regression reported in column 2).
We also check the impact of the amnesty on the overall level of the shadow economy,
being aware that this effect is subject to greater measurement error, given the contempora-
neous implementation of the reform across the country. Performing the relevant F-test—i.e.
checking whether γ + λM¯ = 0—we find a negative and significant effect, which is equal to
−0.37 in case of the column 2 regression,24 implying that the levels of the shadow economy
have been negatively affected by the amnesty.
The 2SLS estimation results reported in Table 10 are stronger than the OLS outcomes.
The link between immigration and the share of shadow economy is substantially decreased
after the amnesty, and is only marginally significant. Focusing on the regression reported in
column 2, the significance of the post-amnesty link between immigration and shadow economy
is only at the 10% level, and the marginal effect passes from 2.97 (before the amnesty) to
0.94 (after the amnesty). The effect of the amnesty on the level of shadow economy is still
negative (-0.37), and significant at the 10% level.
results are available upon request.
24Results for the regressions using Shadow2 as a dependent variable are analogous and available upon
request.
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To summarize, according to the OLS and 2SLS results, the link between immigration and
shadow economy is at least drastically reduced, if not completely wiped out, by the amnesty.
Our hypothesis is that the presence of immigrants contributes to the shadow economy as
long as it provides a supply of workers who are willing to work illegally: this willingness is
strongly correlated with (il)legal status. A strong presence of workers willing (or constrained)
to take up illegal jobs affects the labor market options also of native, generating a labor
market equilibrium which is more reliant on illegal jobs. Alternatively, one may say that the
propensity to work illegally is similar for legal immigrants and indigenous population. The
capacity of the government to absorb migration waves into the legal migrant population is
therefore vital to curb the presence of irregular work, and the social secuirity and tax evasion
which is attached to them.
As an additional robustness check we perform a ‘placebo’ analysis, in which we test the
same effects for every year in our dataset, i.e. as if the policy was implemented in each year
from 1996 to 2005. This additional analysis helps us to verify whether the actual policy
impact, corresponding to the year 2003, can be observed in similar ways also for other years
of our sample, and whether this confirms or weakens our belief that this effect is indeed to
be linked with the amnesty.
To this aim, we re-estimate equation (5), with both OLS and IV techniques, testing for
the effects on a number of placebo policies, for each year of our dataset. In other words, we
perform the same analysis as in equation (5), controlling for a (fake) policy in each year from
1996 to 2005.
In Tables 11 and 12 we report the test of the placebo and the immigration effects for each
year of placebo treatment. Note that the 2003 entry corresponds to the actual amnesty, and
reports the results of the F-tests described in the previous paragraphs.
The placebo analysis largely confirms our results. The nexus between the presence of
immigrants and the share of the shadow economy fades away in correspondence with the
amnesty. More precisely, looking at the estimates in Table 11, the link between these two
phenomena stops being statistically significant at the 5% level from 2002, the year in which
the policy was passed. This might suggest an anticipation effect of the first few months of
implementation of the amnesty.
The policy effect in Table 12 is less robust to this analysis, showing either a significant
and negative effects only for placebo treatments on or after 2003 (OLS analysis), or a posi-




This paper explored the link between the shadow economy and the presence of immigrants in
a country, and the effects of immigration amnesties on this link. To this aim we investigated
the case of Italy in the period 1995-2006. We collected and calculated a number of different
measures of shadow economy: the official irregular job rates, our own measure of shadow
economy based on the physical input approach and finally a microeconomic approach based on
an a repeated cross-section of representative households. Our results show a strong correlation
between the official measures of the shadow economy, and allow us to establish a robust link
between the propensity to evade or share of the shadow economy in a country on the one
hand, and the presence of immigrants on the other hand.
Our explanation relies on a number of considerations: firstly, illegal immigrants are forced
to work in the shadow economy. Secondly, many legal immigrants are employed in the low-
skilled sector, were jobs are less secure and more likely to be irregular. Finally, the wider
availability of illegal workers may concur to the establishment of a job-market equilibrium,
which is more reliant on illegal work.
Our main finding is that an increase by 1% of the immigrant population leads to a 0.4%
increase in the propensity to evade, according to our survey-based analysis, to a 5% increase
in the overall share of the shadow economy and to a 7% increase in the share of irregular
jobs using our aggregate dataset. This link is robust to various specifications, including
instrumental variables.
We then check how this dynamic is affected by immigration amnesties: this is particularly
interesting as these tend not to affect the overall number of immigrant in a country, at least in
the short run, but only to modify the relative size of legal and illegal immigrant populations.
Our analysis shows that amnesty programs tend to reduce this link between immigration and
shadow economy dramatically, suggesting that the main channel through which immigration
and the informal sector are linked is the effect on the labor market equilibrium of the presence
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Table 1: Correlation table: ISTAT Irregular Job index vs. own shadow economy indices.
Variables Shadow1 (IRAP/GDP) Shadow2 (IRAP/ IRAP Base) Irr. Index (SHIW)
Irregular Job Rate 0.80 0.84 0.68
(ISTAT) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2: Summary Statics: Region- and Province-level Aggregate Datasets
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Regional Level Variables
ISTAT Irregular Job Rate 14.624 5.276 300
Immigration (res. permits per 100k inhab., log) 7.545 0.774 240
GDP per capita. Log 3.182 0.27 240
Social Capital 0.721 0.061 240
Civil service efficiency 1.269 0.215 240
Provincial Level Variables
Shadow1 (evaded IRAP /GDP) 18.365 7.959 1140
Shadow2 (evaded IRAP / IRAP taxbase) 31.946 13.641 1140
Immigration (res. permits per 100k inhab., log) 7.483 0.816 1140
GDP per capita. Log 3.158 0.274 1140
Social Capital 0.736 0.073 1140
Civil service efficiency 1.239 0.286 1140
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Table 3: Summary statistics - Micro-level Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Irregularity Index 25.312 28.407 39939
Immigration (res. permits per 100k inhab., log) 7.78 0.709 40579
Disp. Income, Log. 9.768 1.042 36995
Age 42.784 12.388 40579
Age sq. 1983.909 1059.075 40579
Male 0.601 0.49 40579
Married 0.680 0.466 40579
Education 3.711 1.403 40579
Non-employed 0.283 0.451 40579
Self employed 0.196 0.397 40579
Civil service efficiency 1.268 0.203 40579
Social Capital 0.746 0.059 40579
Table 4: Effect of Immigration on the Shadow Economy, OLS estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Irr. Job Rate Irr. Job Rate Shadow1 Shadow1 Shadow2 Shadow2
Immigration 1.581** 1.624** 1.028*** 0.678*** 1.684*** 1.093***
(2.17) (2.47) (4.69) (3.59) (4.37) (3.25)
GDP (pc., log) 13.21*** -14.51*** -24.89***
(3.28) (-9.99) (-10.62)
Social Capital 8.229** 3.054 4.953
(2.02) (1.51) (1.31)
Civil Service Efficiency 1.960*** 0.252 0.458
(3.32) (1.30) (1.28)
Controls N Y N Y N Y
Local FE Reg Reg Prov Prov Prov Prov
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 240 240 1140 1140 1140 1140
r2 0.957 0.966 0.974 0.977 0.972 0.975
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Effect of Immigration on propensity to evade: OLS estimate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Irr. Index Irr. Index Irr. Index Irr. Index Irr. Index
Immigration 2.343*** 3.321*** 3.876*** 3.313*** 2.748***
(2.62) (3.95) (4.65) (4.09) (3.42)
Disp. Income, Log. -6.891*** -6.360*** -4.807*** -4.735***
(-22.39) (-21.16) (-15.68) (-15.54)












Self employed 5.779*** 5.707***
(12.51) (12.36)




Time and Area FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 39939 36398 36398 36398 36398
r2 0.0418 0.117 0.130 0.178 0.180
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6: Effect of Immigration on Shadow Economy - IV approach. First Stage at the
bottom.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Irr Job Rate Irr Job Rate Shadow1 Shadow1 Shadow2 Shadow2
Immigration 10.35*** 7.005*** 4.504*** 5.053*** 8.026*** 9.065***
(3.64) (2.63) (4.55) (5.12) (4.43) (5.00)
GDP per capita. log 18.75*** -11.30*** -19.04***
(3.40) (-7.20) (-7.29)
Social Capital 1.644 -1.169 -2.742
(0.31) (-0.50) (-0.62)
Civil service efficiency 2.477*** 0.553** 1.006**
(3.96) (2.57) (2.55)
N 240 240 1140 1140 1140 1140
r2 0.914 0.951 0.968 0.968 0.965 0.965
First Stage
Instrument 0.664*** 0.672*** 0.733*** 0.744*** 0.733*** 0.744***
(4.86) (4.06) (10.59) (9.71) (10.59) (9.71)
Controls N Y N Y N Y
Local FE Reg Reg Prov Prov Prov Prov
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 240 240 1140 1140 1140 1140
r2 0.914 0.951 0.957 0.959 0.957 0.959
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 7: Effect of Immigration on propensity to evade - IV approach. First Stage in even
columns.
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Disp. Income, Log. -0.237*** -0.00147
(-15.85) (-1.08)
Constant -3.053*** 3.950*** 2.080*** 3.491***
(-5.31) (96.62) (3.15) (47.20)
Controls N N Y Y
Time and area FE Y Y Y Y
N 26498 26498 23331 23331
r2 0.0233 0.942 0.179 0.944
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 8: Amnesties: number of amnestied immigrants, and number of pre-amnesty legal
immigrants
Bill year amnesty pre-amnesty “stock”
Scalfaro 1986 105,000 not av.
Martelli 1990 217,626 not av.
Dini 1995 244,492 729,159
Turco-Napolitano 1998 217,124 1,090,820
Bossi-Fini 2002 704,350 1,503,286
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Table 9: Amnesty Effect - OLS estimates
(1) (3) (3) (4)
Shadow1 Shadow1 Shadow2 Shadow2
Amnesty (γ) 3.995*** 6.160*** 7.303*** 11.08***
(3.59) (6.81) (3.73) (6.83)
Immigration (β) 1.029*** 1.003*** 1.688*** 1.647***
(4.68) (5.42) (4.31) (4.98)
Amn. x Imm. (λ) -0.500*** -0.820*** -0.908*** -1.464***
(-3.58) (-7.28) (-3.68) (-7.23)
GDP per capita. log -15.75*** -27.17***
(-10.97) (-11.53)
Social Capital 0.782 1.023
(0.45) (0.32)
Civil service efficiency 0.172 0.295
(1.06) (1.00)
Trend 0.0442 0.341*** 0.0896* 0.599***
(1.59) (10.30) (1.85) (10.51)
Controls N Y N Y
Local FE Prov Prov Prov Prov
Time FE Y Y Y Y
N 1140 1140 1140 1140
r2 0.974 0.978 0.971 0.975
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 10: Amnesty Effect - IV estimates (First Stage at the bottom)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shadow1 Shadow1 Shadow2 Shadow2
Amnesty 2.971** 4.382*** 5.257** 7.711***
(2.00) (3.50) (2.06) (3.52)
Immigration 1.150** 1.608*** 1.928* 2.723***
(2.02) (3.37) (1.88) (3.12)
Amn. x Imm. -0.374** -0.606*** -0.655** -1.057***
(-2.04) (-3.97) (-2.09) (-3.95)
GDP per capita. log -14.98*** -25.75***
(-11.79) (-12.29)
Social Capital 0.817 1.115
(0.49) (0.36)




Controls N Y N Y
Local FE Prov Prov Prov Prov
Time FE Y Y Y Y
N 1140 1140 1140 1140
r2 0.974 0.977 0.971 0.975
First Stage
Instr. (Immigration) 0.756*** 0.810*** 0.756*** 0.810***
(14.95) (16.29) (14.95) (16.29)
N 1140 1140 1140 1140
r2 0.957 0.959 0.957 0.959
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 11: Placebo Analysis - Immigration Effect (Shadow1)
OLS IV
β + λ p-value β + λP p-value
1996 0.71*** 0.00 2.58*** 0.00
1997 0.46*** 0.01 1.65*** 0.00
1998 0.44*** 0.01 1.47*** 0.00
1999 0.38** 0.02 1.10** 0.03
2000 0.41** 0.01 1.29*** 0.01
2001 0.36** 0.03 1.01** 0.03
2002 0.27 0.10 0.85* 0.08
2003 (Policy) 0.18 0.31 0.94* 0.09
2004 0.01 0.97 0.45 0.38
2005 -0.11 0.59 0.46 0.44
Table 12: Placebo Analysis - “Policy” Effect (Shadow1)
OLS IV
γ + λM¯ p-value γ + λM¯ p-value
1996 -0.69*** 0.00 -0.92*** 0.00
1997 0.21 0.25 0.34* 0.06
1998 0.15 0.32 0.30** 0.03
1999 0.20 0.21 0.36** 0.02
2000 0.26** 0.05 0.42*** 0.00
2001 0.06 0.59 0.20* 0.07
2002 -0.19* 0.09 -0.08 0.46
2003 (Policy) -0.37*** 0.01 -0.37* 0.08
2004 -0.36*** 0.01 -0.24 0.11
2005 -0.32** 0.03 -0.15 0.41
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